@mastersthesis{bal2025literary,
  author = {Bal, Onur},
  title = {Literary Work Readership and Its Relationship with Mentalisation and Empathy},
  school = {Yeditepe University},
  year = {2025},
  type = {Master's thesis},
  url = {https://onurbal.com/en/academics/thesis/}
}

1.1 Key Theoretical Constructs/Concepts and Definitions

In the following sections, mentalisation, empathy, anxiety, and existential concerns will be briefly defined.

1.1.1. Literary Fiction

Literary fiction, a subset of fiction, and therefore of narrative, is often described as imaginative writing that prioritises stylistic richness and psychological depth. Narratives are structured representations of events (real or imagined) arranged in time and often involving goal-driven characters (Bruner, 1990; Herman, 2009). Fiction, as a narrative subset, contains non-factual content and is defined by its imaginative qualities (Bruner, 1990). Literary fiction, in turn, is distinguished not merely by genre but by its use of stylistic foregrounding, ambiguity, and the potential to provoke introspection and insight (Miall & Kuiken, 1999). It often departs from conventional language and structure, encouraging readers to reflect on familiar concepts from unfamiliar perspectives, a process known as defamiliarisation.

1.1.2. Mentalisation

Mentalisation is the capacity to reflect upon and understand one’s own and others’ mental states, including thoughts, beliefs, and intentions (Fonagy & Bateman, 2019). In another sense, this is the ability to see behind the outward actions and behaviours of others, interpreting the underlying thoughts and beliefs. Mentalisation is often discussed in relation to ToM, the broad capacity to attribute mental states (beliefs, desires, intentions, and emotions) to oneself and others as well as use this information to understand, respond to, and predict social behaviours (Premack & Woodruff, 1978; Wellman, 2018). While ToM reflects a foundational cognitive ability, mentalisation encompasses a developmentally grounded process that includes affective understanding and self-reflection, dimensions often captured by the concept of reflective functioning (Fonagy & Target, 1997). Mentalisation is primarily concerned with understanding the mental states that underlie emotions and actions. This distinction is crucial, as one may infer what another person feels without necessarily sharing or experiencing that emotion (Shamay-Tsoory, 2011).

1.1.3. Empathy

Empathy is the capacity to understand and share others’ emotional states (Decety & Jackson, 2004). Though it is a separate concept from both ToM and mentalisation, contemporary research is increasingly viewing it as the affective dimension of social cognition, working in conjunction with mentalisation (Decety & Jackson, 2004; Shamay-Tsoory, 2011). Empathy is the ability to not only recognise others’ feelings but to mirror them, hence its key role for bonding, prosocial behaviour, and moral reasoning (Batson, 2009; Eisenberg & Eggum, 2009). Empathy is further divided into two separate factors, cognitive and affective empathy (Decety & Jackson, 2004; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2009). Cognitive empathy refers to the capacity to discern a person’s emotional perspective, though sharing that emotion is not necessary (Decety & Jackson, 2004; Singer & Lamm, 2009), and affective empathy is the capacity to share and experience the other’s emotional state, creating a sense of emotional resonance or emotional contagion (Zaki & Ochsner, 2012). Though these definitions seem conceptually close to that of mentalisation, what sets them apart is that mentalisation can be self-related as well as other-related, while empathy is other-related only. Furthermore, other-related mentalisation is concerned with the general mental state of the other, while empathy is concerned with the other’s emotional states.

1.1.4. Anxiety

Anxiety is an emotional state that involves heightened arousal, negative affect, and concern about potential threats or uncertain situations (Barlow, 2002). Though often experienced as an aversive emotion, anxiety plays an important evolutionary role as it promotes vigilance, preparing one for possible future dangers (LeDoux & Pine, 2016). It is a protective mechanism which assists threat detection, amplifies attention, and prepares the individual for appropriate response (Grupe & Nitschke, 2013). If it is chronic or not situation appropriate, however, it may negatively impact cognitive flexibility, emotion regulation, and effective social functioning (Shields et al., 2016). High anxiety is associated with hypervigilance, attentional biases regarding threat-related information, and misinterpretation, often resulting in maladaptive behaviour in social contexts (Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). In social contexts, anxiety may limit attentional resources, disrupt working memory capacity (Eysenck et al., 2007), and cause individuals to be overly preoccupied with internal states or social threats, which in turn leads to misinterpretation of others’ thoughts, beliefs, emotions and intentions (Hezel & McNally, 2014).

1.1.5. Existential Concerns

Mortality, freedom, isolation and a search for meaning have been identified as the core existential concerns by Yalom (1980). According to Yalom (1980), each individual struggles with the fact that death is inevitable, both for oneself and others, that freedom, while usually seen as a positive state, also comes with the burden of responsibility for the choices one makes, that loneliness is an inherent part of existence, and finally that there is no objective meaning to life, but rather a subjective one that is for each individual to craft for themselves. These concerns are an inherent part of what is known as the “human condition” (van Bruggen et al., 2017). According to Yalom (1980), confronting these concerns leads to either existential anxiety or personal growth. Hence, these concerns are not positive or negative in and of themselves. Like anxiety, it is the persistent and unresolved preoccupation with these concerns that determines their psychological impact.